There has been a recent interest in hierarchical generalisations of classic incompleteness results. This paper provides evidence that such generalisations are readibly obtainable from suitably hierarchical versions of the principles used in the original proof. By collecting such principles, we prove hierarchical versions of Mostowski's theorem on independent formulae, Kripke's theorem on flexible formulae, and a number of further generalisations thereof. As a corollary, we obtain the expected result that the formula expressing "T is Σn-ill" is a canonical example of a Σn+1 formula that is Πn+1-conservative over T.
Introduction
There has been a recent interest in hierarchical generalisations of classic incompleteness results [4, 20, 23, 35] . A sample result, generalising Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, and independently proved in both [20] and [35] , is: Theorem 1. Let T be a Σ n+1 -definable, Σ n -sound extension of PA. Then there is a Π n+1 -sentence that is undecidable in T.
In this paper I argue that such hierarchical generalisations can often be obtained from the original proofs by replacing certain principles used in the proofs by appropriately formulated hierarchical versions, while the essence of the arguments remain the same. The hierarchical principles, once appropriately formulated, are in turn often provable by appropriate generalisations of the core concepts employed in the proofs of the ordinary ones, but even so, there is no single source to which to turn for them. Both Smoryński [39] and Beklemishev [1] give good partial accounts of the syntactical side, and Poizat [31] gives a hierarchical perspective on the basic model theory of arithmetic, including model-theoretic proofs of hierarchical versions of Gödel's first and second incompleteness theorems. Still, I find certain aspects lacking. With this in mind, one aim of this paper is to collect a number of principles that may be useful to the reader who herself wishes to prove hierarchical incompleteness results without having to reinvent the wheel.
These principles are then put to use to prove a number of general incompleteness results for arithmetically definable fragments of PA. The goal is not to prove the sharpest or most general results (in fact some of the results follow from each other), but rather to exemplify how the hierarchical principles enter into more or less well-known proof methods. Even so, the results presented here improve on some results of Chao and Seraji [4] , Kikuchi and Kurahashi [20] , and Salehi and Seraji [35] , and sharpen some of Blanck [2] , Hamkins [17] , and Lindström [24] . These sharpenings are in terms of gauging the amount of induction needed for the proofs, bringing the (in this particular sub-field largely ignored) fragments-of-arithmetic perspective to attention.
Notation and conventions
Let the arithmetical hierarchy be defined as usual. B n is the collection of Boolean combinations of Σ n formulae, and ∆ n (M) is the set of Σ n formulae that are equivalent to Π n formulae in some model M. When writing ∆ n , we mean ∆ n (N). Throughout the paper Γ denotes either Σ n or Π n , for n > 0.
If φ(x) is any formula, φ(x) denotes the numeral for the Gödel number of φ(x) under some fixed Gödel numbering, but we make no typographical distinction between natural numbers and the corresponding numerals. We use Feferman's dot notation φ(ẋ) to represent the Gödel number of the sentence obtained by replacing the variable x with the actual value of x; hence x is free in φ(ẋ) . The notation := is used to express equality between formulae. Let ⊤ := 0 = 0 and ⊥ := ¬⊤. Let φ 0 := φ and φ 1 := ¬φ. The notation ∃!xφ(x) is used as shorthand for ∃x(φ(x) ∧ ∀y(φ(y) → x = y)).
T is Γ-sound iff for all γ ∈ Γ, if T ⊢ γ then N |= γ. The other direction is sometimes known as Γ-completeness: hence T is Γ-complete iff for all γ ∈ Γ, if N |= γ, then T ⊢ γ.
A relation is numerated in T by a formula φ iff X = { k 1 , . . . , k n ∈ ω n : T ⊢ φ(k 1 , . . . , k n )}, and binumerated by φ in T if ¬φ also numerates the complement of X. A function f is strongly representable in T iff there is a formula φ(x 1 , . . . , x n , y) that binumerates f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = y in T, and moreover, if
Given a formula τ (x), let Prf τ (x, y) be a formula expressing "y is a proof of the sentence x from the set of sentences satisfying τ (z)"; this formula can be defined to have the same complexity as τ (z). Let Pr τ (x) be the formula ∃yPrf τ (x, y), and let Con τ be the sentence ¬Pr τ (⊥). Whenever τ (z) is Σ n+1 , the same holds true for Pr τ (x), while Con τ is Π n+1 . When T is Σ n+1 -definable, we write Pr T (x), etc., instead of Pr σ (x) for some fixed Σ n+1 -definition σ(x) of T.
Models of arithmetic are denoted M, etc., while the respective domains are denoted M , etc. The standard model is denoted N. If M is non-standard, the standard system of M, SSy(M), is the collection of of sets X ⊆ ω such that for some a ∈ M , X = {n ∈ ω : M |= nǫa}, where ǫ is Ackermann's membership relation expressing "the nth bit of the binary expansion of a is 1". Then X is coded in M, and a is a code for X.
Let Y be a set of formulae.
If Y is a set of sentences, then Th Y (M) is the set of Y -sentences true in M, that is, the set {φ ∈ Y : M |= φ}. If M is a submodel of N and for all a ∈ M and γ(x) ∈ Γ, M |= γ(a) iff N |= γ(a), then N is a Γ-elementary extension of M. If M |= σ for some Σ n+1 sentence σ, and N is a Σ n -elementary extension of M, then N |= σ. N is an end-extension of M (or, equivalently, M is an initial segment of N ) iff M is a submodel of N , and whenever a ∈ M and b ∈ N , and
Let ∅ (n) denote the nth Turing jump of the empty set (see, e.g. Rogers [34, p. 254] ). For each n, let ϕ for some e, then e is an n-index for f .
We assume that all theories denoted T, etc., are consistent, arithmetically definable, extensions of Q in the same language. IΣ n is the theory obtained by adding induction for Σ n formulae to Q, while I∆ 0 + exp is Q plus ∆ 0 -induction plus an axiom stating that the exponentiation function is total.
Preliminary principles
This section collects a number of hierarchically formulated principles that are useful to prove hierarchical incompleteness results of the kind given in Theorem 1. None of the principles should come as a surprise, and with the possible exception of Fact 13, they can all be found scattered across the literature.
The first thing to make sure when attempting to generalise to hierarchies is that the ordinary, non-hierarchical statement fits nicely into the hierarchical one. The first fact, consisting of three observations (see, e.g. Beklemishev [ 
T is Σ
3. T is consistent iff T is Σ 0 -sound. Fact 2 (Generalised Craig's trick). Every Σ n+1 -definable theory has a deductively equivalent Π n -definition.
Bibliographical remark. Craig's [7] formulation pertains to r.e. theories having deductively equivalent primitive recursive definitions. The hierarchical generalisation is due to Grzegorczyk et al. [13, 2.2 .C].
From these first two facts, we see that the ordinary formulation "r.e., consistent" can be rephrased as "Σ 1 -definable, Σ 0 -sound", thereby establishing the base level of the hierarchy. Therefore, Theorem 1 for n = 0 is precisely the Gödel-Rosser incompleteness theorem.
Fact 3 (Post's theorem [32] , cf. Rogers [34, Theorem 14 .VIII]).
2. Every Σ n set is Turing reducible to ∅ (n) .
Fact 4.
A set is Γ-definable iff it is numerated by a Γ formula in Q + Th
This fact is the counterpart of the famous observation that all r.e. sets can be represented in Q. The first two items are immediately seen to be true, while the third follows from Fact 3 together with the observation that Th Bn (N) is recursive in ∅ (n) , Σ n+1 -complete, and Π n+1 -sound.
Fact 5 (The parametric diagonal lemma). For every Γ formula γ(x, y), we can effectively find a Γ formula ξ(x) such that
Bibliographical remark. This form of the diagonal lemma is essentially due to Montague [28, Lemma 1] . The proof by Ehrenfeucht and Feferman [9, Lemma 1] of a weaker result actually suffices to prove the above; see also Smoryński [38] for a discussion of the development of the diagonal lemma.
Fact 6 (Partial satisfaction predicates). For each k and Γ, there is a k + 1-ary Γ formula Sat Γ (x, x 1 , . . . , x k ) such that for every Γ-formula φ(x 1 , . . . , x k ),
Hence there is also a Γ formula Tr Γ (x) such that for every Γ sentence φ,
Bibliographical remark. The use of partial satisfaction predicates goes back to Hilbert and Bernays [18] . Modern proofs can be found in [19] and [16] .
The next fact also has its roots with Hilbert and Bernays [18] ; see also Feferman [10, Lemma 3.10] and Beklemishev [1, Proposition 2.11]. Let Pr T,Γ (x) be the formula ∃y ∈ Γ(Tr Γ (y) ∧ Pr T+y (x)), and let Con T,Γ be ¬Pr T,Γ (⊥).
Fact 7 (Provable Γ-completeness). Let σ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) be any Γ formula. Then
The provability predicates are subject to the following very useful conditions; they originate with Hilbert and Bernays [18] , subsequently refined by Löb [27] . Fact 8 (Löb conditions in I∆ 0 + exp). Let X be any set of Γ sentences such that T + X is consistent. Then for all sentences φ, ψ,
Similar statements also hold for formulae with free variables.
Let Pr
Fact 9 (Small reflection). Let T be a consistent extension of Q, and let φ(x) be any formula. We have:
Bibliographical remark. A forerunner to this reflection principle is proved in Feferman [11, Lemma 2.18 ]. Verbrugge and Visser [40] show how that principle can be formalised in (theories weaker than) I∆ 0 + exp. The hierarchical generalisation is straightforward; see also Hájek and Pudlák [16, Lemma III.4.40] . Fact 11. If M is a non-standard model of IΣ n , and φ(x) is a Σ n formula, then {k ∈ ω : M |= φ(k)} is coded in M. The next fact is an excerpt of a generalisation of the Orey-Hájek-GuaspariLindström characterisation of interpretability. For extensions of PA, the equivalence of (1) and (3) is due to Guaspari [14, Theorem 6.5(i)]. The equivalence of (1) and (2) for finitely axiomatisable theories seems to have been known to experts for some time, while the equivalence of (2) and (3) The last part of this section is devoted to some standard results from recursion theory, and their relationship to the type of arithmetised metamathematics as developed above. A good source for the next three facts is Kleene [21] Theorems XXVII, IV, and XXII, respectively. Fact 14 (The recursion theorem). Let f (z, x 1 , . . . , x n ) be any partial n-recursive function. There is an n-index e such that Fact 15 (The normal form theorem). Every Σ n+1 -definable set can be defined by a Σ n+1 formula on Kleene normal form: ∃y 1 ∀y 2 . . . Q n+1 T (i, x, y 1 , . . . , y n )) for a suitable choice of i. Here T is Kleene's primitive recursive T -predicate, Q is ∃ or ∀ depending on whether n + 1 is odd or even, and in the latter case, T is prefixed by a negation symbol.
Fact 16 (The enumeration theorem). For each n, there is an n-recursive function that is universal for n-recursive functions, that is, a function Φ n (x, y) such that for each n-recursive function f with index e, Φ n (e, y) = z iff f (y) = z.
By Facts 3 and 4, there is a Σ n+1 formula R n (x, y, z) binumerating the relation Φ n (x, y) = z in Q + Th Bn (N). In certain cases we can assume that this representation has particularly nice properties, using the following result which is taken from Smoryński [39, Theorem 0.6.9] for the case n = 0. The hierarchical generalisation given here is supposedly folklore, and in any case, easy to prove using Smoryński's argument.
Fact 17 (The selection theorem). For each Σ n+1 -formula φ with exactly the variables x 1 , . . . , x k free, there is a Σ n+1 -formula Sel{φ} with exactly the same free variables, such that:
These formulae are useful in that they can be used in combination with partial satisfaction predicates to strongly represent n-recursive functions in extensions of IΣ n + Th Bn (N), by instead letting ϕ e be the n-recursive function whose graph is defined by Sel{Sat Σn+1 }(e, y 1 , . . . , y k , z) in N. The resulting enumeration is acceptable in Rogers's sense, so whenever convenient, it can without loss of generality be assumed that R n (x, y 1 , . . . , y k , z) := Sel{Sat Σn+1 }(x, y 1 , . . . , y k , z).
Applications
The goal of this section is to prove a handful of hierarchical incompleteness results, using the tools we reviewed in the previous one. The first such result stems from Mostowski [29, Theorem 2] , who proved that whenever T i : i ∈ ω is an r.e. family of consistent, r.e. theories extending Q, then there is a Π 1 formula that is simultaneously independent over these theories. Here, we understand the concept of an independent formula in the following way:
Definition. A formula ξ(x) is independent over T if, for every f : ω → {0, 1}, the theory T + {ξ(n) f (n) } is consistent, where φ 0 = φ and φ 1 = ¬φ.
While one of Mostowski's accomplishments was the simultaneous independence over a whole r.e. family of theories, this aspect of his result is deliberately ignored here. Instead, we focus on how to construct formulae independent over Σ n+1 -definable theories. Note the striking similarity with the statement of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let T be a Σ n+1 -definable, Σ n -sound extension of Q. Then there is a Σ n+1 formula ξ(x) that is independent over T.
Proof. Define a function f (x) by the stipulation that f (m) = k iff
Since T is Σ n+1 -definable, the relation f (x) = y is Σ n+1 , and therefore f is recursive in ∅ (n) by Fact 3. Let, by Fact 16, e be an n-index for f , and let ξ(x) be the Σ n+1 formula ∃z(R n (e, e, z) ∧ ∃yT (z, x, y)), where T is Kleene's T -predicate.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that T+R n (e, e, k)∧∃!zR(e, e, z) is inconsistent for some k ∈ ω. Then T ⊢ ¬(R n (e, e, k)∧∃!zR(e, e, z)), so f (e) = k by definition. But then T+Th Σn+1 (N) ⊢ R n (e, e, k)∧∃!zR n (e, e, z) by Fact 4, so T+Th Σn+1 (N) is inconsistent, which by Fact 1 contradicts the assumption that T is Σ n -sound. Hence the theory T + R n (e, e, k) ∧ ∃!zR(e, e, z) is consistent for any choice of k ∈ ω.
Let g be any function from ω to {0, 1} and let X = {ξ(k) g(k) : k ∈ ω}. Let Y be any finite subset of X, and let Z be the set {k : ξ(k) ∈ Y }. By Fact 15, there is an index i such that ∃yT (i, x, y) binumerates Z in Q. Reason in the consistent theory T + R n (e, e, i) ∧ ∃!zR(e, e, z):
If ξ(x), R n (e, e, z) ∧ ∃yT (z, x, y) for some z. But z is unique and R n (e, e, i) , so ∃yT (i, x, y).
Since R n (e, e, i), ξ(x) follows from ∃yT (i, x, y) by ∃-introduction.
Hence the theory T + ∀x(ξ(x) ↔ ∃yT (i, x, y)) is consistent. If k ∈ Y , then T ⊢ ∃yT (i, k, y), so T + ∀x(ξ(x) ↔ ∃yT (i, x, y)) ⊢ ξ(k), and similarly for k / ∈ Y . Since the consistent theory T + ∀x(ξ(x) ↔ ∃yT (i, x, y)) proves all the sentences in Y , so T+ Y is consistent. By compactness, it follows that T+ X is consistent, and therefore ξ(x) is independent over T.
The Gödel-Rosser incompleteness theorem now follows directly from the result above. While the generalisation to arithmetically definable fragments is new, the basic idea of this proof is due to Kripke [22, Corollary 1.1], who used it to rederive Mostowski's result from his own theorem on the existence of flexible formulae. Here, we understand flexibility in the following sense:
Definition. A formula γ(x) is flexible for Γ over T if, for every δ(x) ∈ Γ, the theory T + ∀x(γ(x) ↔ δ(x)) is consistent.
The definitions used by Kripke obscure the original content of his theorem, but in hindsight his proof yields that for every consistent, r.e. extension T of I∆ 0 + exp, there is a Σ n+1 formula that is flexible for Σ n+1 over T. Striving for some unification, we derive an hierarchical version of Kripke's theorem by generalising a result of Lindström's [24, Proposition 2]; which in turn is a generalisation of both Mostowski's and Kripke's results, as well as of Scott's famous lemma used to realise countable Scott sets as standard systems of models of PA [36] . Theorem 3. Let T be a Σ n+1 -definable extension of I∆ 0 + exp. For every Σ m formula φ(x) with m ≥ n, there is a Σ m+1 formula γ(x) such that for every g ∈ ω 2, if
Proof. Fix n and let φ(x) ∈ Σ m , with m ≥ n. Let f (s, η) = σ iff s is binary sequence of length k such that
Minimise, first on the Gödel number of σ(x), then on the Gödel number of s to make sure that f is well-defined. Then f is recursive in ∅ (n) by Fact 3. Let Seq φ (x) be the formula
where l(x) denotes the length of s. Whenever φ(x) is Σ m , Seq φ (x) is ∆ m+1 . Let, by Fact 16, e be an n-index for f and let, by Fact 5, γ(x) be a Σ m+1 formula such that
Suppose, for a contradiction, that there is a g ∈ ω 2 such that T g is Σ n -sound, but T g + ∀x(γ(x) ↔ σ(x)) is inconsistent for some σ(x) ∈ Σ m+1 . Then there is a shortest finite initial subsequence s of g such that
But then, by construction, f (s, γ) = σ, and by Fact 4,
) by an argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 2. Then T g + Th Σn+1 (N) is inconsistent, contradicting the assumption that T g was Σ n -sound.
By choosing φ(x) as a decidable formula in the construction above, we obtain the expected hierarchical version of Kripke's theorem:
Mostowski's theorem for extensions of I∆ 0 +exp then follows immediately by using the method described in the proof of Theorem 2. A similar argument also yields Scott's lemma. Our next step is to show how the hierarchical version of Kripke's theorem can be formalised in IΣ n+1 . The proof is a minor modification of an argument of Blanck [2, Theorem 5.1].
Theorem 4. Let S be a Σ n+1 -definable, Σ n -sound extension of IΣ n+1 , and let T be a Σ n+1 -definable extension of Q. For all m ≥ n, there is a Σ m+1 formula γ(x) such that:
2. if σ(x) ∈ Σ m+1 , then, every model of S + Con T,Σn+1 has a Σ n -elementary extension to a model of T + ∀x(γ(x) ↔ σ(x)).
Proof. Fix n, and let φ(x, z) be the Σ n+1 formula Pr T,Σn+1 ( ¬R n (ẋ,ẋ,ż) ). Let e be the Gödel number of φ(x, z).
By construction of φ(x, z) we have
and by Fact 7
S ⊢ ∀z(R n (e, e, z) → Pr T,Σn+1 ( R n (e, e,ż) )).
Then (1) and (2) together with Fact 8 give S ⊢ ∀z(Con T,Σn+1 → ¬R n (e, e, z)).
Observe that S ⊢ ∃z¬Con T,Σn+1+R n (e,e,z) ↔ ∃zPr T,Σn+1 ( R n (e, e,ż) ),
which by construction of φ(x, z) together with Fact 17 give S ⊢ ∃z¬Con T,Σn+1+R n (e,e,z) ↔ ∃zR n (e, e, z).
Together with (3), this implies S ⊢ ∀z(Con T,Σn+1 → Con T,Σn+1+R n (e,e,z) ).
We claim that the Σ m+1 formula γ(x) := ∃z(R n (e, e, z) ∧ Sat Σm+1 (z, x)) is as desired. Let M be any model of S + Con T,Σn+1 . Then the first part of the theorem follows directly from (3) .
For the latter part, let σ(x) be any Σ m+1 formula; then by (6), we immediately get M |= Con T,Σn+1+R n (e,e, σ ) . Since T is Σ n+1 -definable and S is Σ n -sound, Fact 6 implies that T + Th Σn+1 (M) + R n (e, e, σ ) is Σ n+1 (M)-definable. By Fact 10, there is an end-extension K of M that satisfies T + Th Σn+1 (M) + R n (e, e, σ ). Since SSy(M) = SSy(K) and, by construction, Th Σn+1 (M) ⊆ Th Σn+1 (K), Fact 12 ensures that M is embeddable as a Σ nelementary initial segment of K. Since K satisfies R n (e, e, σ ), it follows that K |= ∀x(γ(x) ↔ σ(x)), as desired.
Corollary. For each σ(x) ∈ Σ n+1 , with γ(x) as above, T + ∀x(γ(x) ↔ σ(x)) is Π n+1 -conservative over T + Con T,Σn+1 .
Our next theorem has a different flavour than the earlier ones, and is a generalisation of Woodin's theorem on the universal algorithm [41] ; see also [3, Theorem 3.1] . A version for r.e. extensions of PA is independently due to Hamkins [17, Theorem 17] , and the proof presented here uses a method that I learned from Shavrukov.
Theorem 5. Let T be a Σ n+1 -definable, Σ n -sound extension of IΣ n+1 . There is an Σ n+1 -definable set W e such that:
2. for each countable model M |= T, if s is an M-finite set such that M |= W e ⊆ s, then there is a Σ n -elementary extension of M satisfying T+W e = s.
Proof. We use the formalisation of Fact 14 in IΣ n+1 to define the desired set W e in stages. At the same time, an auxiliary function r(x) is defined.
Stage 0: Set W e,0 = ∅, and r(0) = ∞. Case A: s ⊇ W e,x , k < m, and x witnesses a Σ n+1 sentence σ(s) such that k is a proof in T + Th Σn+1 (N) of ∀t(σ(t) → W e = t). Then set W e,x+1 = s and r(x + 1) = k;
Case B: otherwise, set W e,x+1 = W e,x and r(x + 1) = m.
Let W e = x W e,x . Since provability in T + Th Σn+1 (N) is Σ n+1 , W e is r.e. in ∅ (n) , and therefore Σ n+1 by Fact 3. Provably in IΣ n+1 , we have that W e,x+1 ⊇ W e,x , and r(x+1) ≤ r(x), so by the Σ n+1 -least number principle, there is a limit R = lim x r(x).
For each x with W e,x+1 = W e,x , IΣ n+1 proves r(x + 1) < r(x), whence there can only be finitely many such x. So IΣ n+1 ⊢ "W e is finite".
Note that T ⊢ R > k for all k ∈ ω. To show this, fix k ∈ ω and argue in T:
Suppose R ≤ k. Let y be minimal such that r(y + 1) = R. Then W e = W e,y+1 = s for some s such that R is a proof in T+Th Σn+1 (N) of ∀t(σ(t) → W e = t), where σ(s) is a true Σ n+1 sentence.
But, by Fact 9, since ∀t(σ(t) → W e = t) is proved from true Σ n+1 -sentences with a proof not exceeding k, it must be true. Since σ(s) is true, W e = s is also true, and the contradiction proves R > k.
To prove (1), argue for the contrapositive statement in IΣ n+1 :
If W e = s = ∅, then Pr m T ( ∀t(σ(t) → W e = t) ) for some m. Since W e is finite, s ⊆ W e is Σ n+1 . Then Pr T,Σn+1 ( s ⊆ W e ) follows by Fact 7. Now reason inside Pr T,Σn+1 :
There is some u = W e with u ⊇ s, so by construction, σ(u) is true, and Pr k T ( ∀t(σ(t) → W e = t) ) for some k ≤ m.
Apply Fact 9, and continue reasoning inside Pr T,Σn+1 :
Then ∀t(σ(t) → W e = t) and σ(u), so W e = u.
Then Pr T,Σn+1 ( ∃u(W e = u∧W e = u) ), so Fact 8 gives ¬Con T,Σn+1 as desired.
To prove (2), first fix m ∈ ω. By Fact 17, there is a proof k in T of ∀t(Pr m T,Σn+1 ( W e =ṫ ) → W e = t).
Now reason in T:
Consider any finite s ⊇ W e , and suppose x is a proof ≤ m of W e = s in T + Th Σn+1 (N). Then s ⊇ W e,x+1 , and therefore r(x + 1) ≤ k by construction of r(x + 1): here Pr m T,Σn+1 ( W e = s ) is a true sentence playing the role of σ(s). But k ≤ R < r(x+1), and the contradiction proves Con m T,Σn+1+We=s . Let M be any countable model of T. Since T is Σ n+1 -definable and Σ nsound, Facts 6 and 11 imply that T + Th Σn+1 (M) + W e = s ∈ SSy(M). Since T ⊢ Con m T,Σn+1+We=s for all m ∈ ω, the theorem now follows using Fact 13.
Corollary. With T as above, ¬Con T,Σn+1 is Π n+1 -conservative over T.
Proof. Every countable model of T has a Σ n -elementary extension satisfying W e = ∅, and therefore T + ¬Con T,Σn+1 by the theorem. By Fact 13, the conclusion follows.
The final theorem is of a more Kripkean variety, and improves on Theorem 7.21 of [2] by generalising to arithmetically definable theories. A version for r.e. extensions of PA is independently due to Hamkins [17, Theorem 21(1) ], who also noted that there is a very short proof of it from Theorem 5.
Theorem 6. Let T be a Σ n+1 -definable, Σ n -sound extension of IΣ n+1 . For all m ≥ n, there is a Σ m+2 formula γ(x) such that:
Discussion
The generalisation from "consistent, r.e." to "Σ n -sound, Σ n+1 -definable" seems to be very robust. The observation that ¬Con T,Σn+1 is Π n+1 -conservative over Σ n -sound T can be taken to corroborate this view, since the case n = 0, in light of Fact 1, coincides with Kreisel's observation that ¬Con T is Π 1 -conservative over consistent T.
The properties of Σ n -soundness and Σ n+1 -definability seem to go hand in hand since Σ n -soundness of T implies consistency of T + Th Σn+1 (N). As this latter theory is Σ n+1 -definable, we can freely bump up the complexity of T to Σ n+1 without losing definability, and the addition of all the true Σ n+1 sentences is enough to allow for binumeration of the more complex relations needed to represent the resulting n-recursive functions that are used in some of the proofs.
The Facts listed in Section 3 should be enough to derive hierarchical generalisations for arithmetically definable fragments of PA of many of the theorems in, e.g., Lindström's classic Aspects of Incompleteness. In fact, I would be interested to see an example of a result proved in, say, the first 5 chapters of Aspects (where the results do not depend on T being essentially reflexive) that is not prone to such a generalisation, using these principles.
